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Should	Kids	Pay	Their	Own	Way?	
Patrick	Tomlin	
University	of	Reading	
	
Published	in:	Political	Studies	63.3	(2015):	663-678.	
	
	
Children	are	expensive	to	raise.	Ensuring	that	they	are	raised	such	that	they	are	able	to	
lead	a	minimally	decent	life	costs	time	and	money,	and	lots	of	both.	Who	is	
responsible	for	bearing	the	costs	of	the	things	that	children	are	undoubtedly	owed?	
This	is	a	question	that	has	received	comparatively	little	scrutiny	from	political	
philosophers,	despite	children	being	such	a	drain	on	public	and	private	finances	alike.	
To	the	extent	that	there	is	a	debate,	two	main	views	can	be	identified.	The	Parents	Pay	
view	says	that	parents,	responsible	for	the	existence	of	the	costs,	must	foot	the	bill.	The	
Society	Pays	view	says	that	a	next	generation	is	a	benefit	to	all,	and	so	to	allow	parents	
to	foot	the	bill	alone	is	the	worst	kind	of	free-riding.	In	this	paper,	I	introduce	a	third	
potentially	liable	party	currently	missing	from	the	debate:	children	themselves.	On	my	
backward-looking	view,	we	are	entitled	to	ask	people	to	contribute	to	the	raising	of	
children	on	the	basis	that	they	have	benefited	from	being	raised	themselves.	
	
	
Introduction	
Children	have	a	unique	moral	status.	They	are	not	full	moral	agents	and	have	never	
been	full	moral	agents	but,	unlike	other	such	beings	(fish,	for	example),	there	are	
duties	on	at	least	some	of	us	to	turn	them	into	full	moral	agents.	This	is,	at	least	in	
part,	what	it	is	to	raise	a	child.	Raising	children	is	an		
expensive	business	–	they	cost	time	and	money,	and	lots	of	both.	They	need	clothes,	
shelter,	food,	teachers,	healthcare	and	a	great	deal	of	supervision,	attention,	and	
effort.1	Who	should	ultimately	bear	the	costs	of	these	things	that	children	are	
undoubtedly	owed?	
	
Despite	being	such	a	huge	drain	on	(presently)	both	public	and	private	finances,	
exactly	who	should	be	picking	up	the	tab	for	these	proto-agents	has	received	relatively	
little	attention	from	political	philosophers.	To	the	extent	that	there	is	a	debate	on	this,	
two	main	views	can	be	identified.2	One	view	identifies	the	group	‘parents’	as	liable	for	
                                                
1	The	private	financial	costs	alone	currently	stand	at,	on	average,	£271,499	per	child	in	the	UK	
(‘Family’,	The	Guardian,	26	February	2011).	For	a	more	detailed	breakdown	of	the	costs	of	raising	
children,	see	Bou-Habib’s	(2013,	p.	199)	summary	of	Folbre	2008.	
2	For	an	overview	of	the	literature,	see	Casal	and	Williams	2008,	pp.	166-170.	
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the	costs	of	raising	children.3	I	will	call	this	view	Parents	Pay.	The	other	view	holds	that	
(adult)	non-parents	are	liable	for	at	least	some	of	the	costs,	usually	based	on	the	
notion	that	a	next	generation	is	a	benefit	for	all,	and	thus	to	allow	parents	to	bear	all	
the	costs	of	raising	children	would	be	the	worst	kind	of	free-riding.	Parents	are	doing	a	
job	on	behalf	of	us	all,	and	the	non-parents	should	help	them	out	with	that.	I	will	call	
this	view	Society	Pays.4	
	
Good	arguments	have	been	offered	on	behalf	of,	and	against,	both	views.	The	central	
aim	of	this	essay,	however,	is	to	question	whether	these	two	lines	of	argument	exhaust	
the	option	set.	Are	these	the	only	bases	on	which	we	might	be	considered	liable	for	the	
costs	of	raising	children	–	as	the	initiators	of	a	childrearing	project	or	as	the	future	
beneficiaries	of	such	projects?	I	suggest	not.	I	do	this	by	introducing	a	potentially	
liable	party	missing	from	the	debate	at	present:	children	themselves.	In	this	essay	I	put	
forward	some	arguments	suggesting	that	children	(upon	reaching	adulthood)	should	
be	considered	liable	for	some	of	the	costs	of	raising	them,	on	the	basis	that	they	have	
benefited	from	being	raised.	
	
The	article	proceeds	as	follows.	In	the	second	section	I	clarify	the	topic	and	introduce	
some	assumptions.	The	restrictions	these	place	on	the	immediate	policy-relevance	of	
the	argument	are	noted.	The	third	section	introduces	the	Parents	Pay	and	Society	Pays	
views	in	a	little	more	detail.	In	the	section	entitled	‘Foisting	Benefits	on	Children’	I	
begin	to	mount	the	case	for	my	view	(called	Kids	Pay),	noting	how	it	relies	on	a	similar	
principle	to	Society	Pays,	namely	the	principle	of	fair	play.	I	argue	that	the	situation	in	
which	children	receive	the	goods	of	raising	is	one	in	which	the	principle	of	fair	play	is	
applicable.	In	the	two	sections	that	follow	that,	I	consider	two	putative	restrictions	on	
fair	play	obligations,	arguing	that	on	the	best	understandings	of	these	restrictions	(and	
on	certain	assumptions	about	what	we	do	when	we	create	children)	Kids	Pay	survives.	
Finally	I	consider	and	refute	an	objection	to	Kids	Pay,	which	is	that	the	theory	has	
inegalitarian	consequences,	because	it	seems	to	suggest	that	children	who	are	
expensive	to	raise	must	pay	more.	
	
                                                
3	See:	Steiner	1994,	pp.	275-279;	Steiner	2009;	Rakowski	1991,	pp.	150-154;	Valentyne	2002;	
Clayton	2006,	pp.	67-70.	
4	See:	George	1987,	1994;	Folbre	1994;	Friedman	1962,	ch.	6	(cit.	Goodin	2005).	For	important	
arguments	against	this	view,	see:	Casal	and	Williams	1995,	2004	and	Casal	1999.		
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Some	Assumptions	and	Clarifications	
Before	we	proceed	to	the	argument,	some	assumptions	must	be	made	explicit,	and	
some	clarifications	made.	I	assume	throughout	a	just	background	distribution	–	that	is,	
prior	to	the	question	of	children,	everyone	has	what	they	justly	should.5	I	also	assume	
that	(in	normal	circumstances)	children	are	owed	or	must	have	certain	things	which	
are	essential	for	their	development.	I	am	not,	here,	going	to	try	to	specify	exactly	what	
state	it	is	that	we	must	try	to	get	children	to,	nor	exactly	what	goods	are	necessary	for	
them	to	get	there.	I	will	simply	say	that	they	are	owed	the	goods	necessary	for	a	
minimally	decent	or	acceptable	life.	Providing	these	things	constitute	the	costs	of	
raising	children.6	
	
In	this	essay	I	am	concerned	with	which	agents	are	primarily	liable	for	these	costs	–	
that	is,	I	am	interested	in	whom	the	duty	falls	to	first.	Other	agents	(and	in	particular	
the	state)	may	have	secondary	duties	–	duties	to	step	in	when	the	primary	duty-bearer	
fails	to	discharge	their	duty.7	
	
It	should	be	made	clear	that	two	of	the	above	assumptions	–	the	just	background	
distribution	and	the	focus	on	primary	duty	bearers	–	heavily	restrict	this	essay	in	terms	
of	its	immediate	policy	implications.	There	may	be	(and	I	believe	there	are)	many	good	
reasons	for	state	support	for	parents	in	the	absence	of	the	ideal	conditions	of	the	just	
background	distribution,	and	in	the	role	of	secondary	duty-bearer.	In	particular,	in	
contemporary	societies	there	is	an	important	gender	dimension	to	all	issues	of	
                                                
5	The	just	background	distribution	includes	the	stipulation	that	previous	generations	have	
correctly	distributed	the	costs	of	raising	children	(whatever	the	correct	distribution	turns	out	to	
be).	If,	however,	previous	generations	have	been	raised	under	Parents	Pay	and	we	then	decide	
that	Kids	Pay	is	(one	of)	the	right	principle(s),	then	today’s	children	will	be	disadvantaged	in	
comparison	to	today’s	adults	(who	were	given	a	free	raising).	Through	the	just	background	
assumption,	I	set	aside	complications	of	past	partial	compliance	and	transitional	justice	here.	I	
am	grateful	to	a	Political	Studies	referee	for	encouraging	me	to	make	this	explicit.	
6	It	is	important	not	to	conflate	the	specific	costs	of	raising	children	with	the	more	general	costs	
(or	benefits)	of	having	additional	adult	members	of	society	(‘the	costs	of	added	members’).	On	
this	important	distinction,	see	Olsaretti	2009;	Bou-Habib	2013.	There	are	of	course	many	non-
essential	benefits	that	we	provide	our	children	with.	These	are	outside	the	scope	of	the	present	
essay.	
7	Although	the	view	that	I	present	here	(in	which	children	are	primary	duty-bearers)	has	not	
thus	far	been	explored	in	depth	in	the	literature,	Ronald	Dworkin	(2000,	p.	339)	briefly	
considers	a	hypothetical	insurance	model	in	which	children	insure	against	their	parents	being	
unable	to	provide	for	them.	This	implicitly	considers	parents	as	the	primary	duty-bearers	(since	
if	they	can	pay,	they	should),	and	children	(as	a	whole)	as	secondary	duty-bearers.	
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childcare	which	I	do	not	even	touch	upon	here,	but	which	it	would	be	impossible	to	
ignore	from	a	policy	point	of	view	(Casal	1999,	p.	374).	
	
Existing	Views	
Fred	and	Wilma:	Fred	and	Wilma	live	next	door	to	Barney	and	Betty.	Both	
couples	are	childless,	and	there	is	just	distribution	between	them.	Fred	and	
Wilma	decide	to	have	a	child,	and	the	beautiful	Pebbles	is	born	nine	months	
later.	Fred	and	Wilma’s	lives	change	dramatically.	Pebbles	must	be	cared	for	
around	the	clock,	and	must	be	clothed,	kept	warm,	fed	and	so	on,	and	these	
burdens	fall	on	Fred	and	Wilma’s	shoulders.	Fred	and	Wilma’s	free	time	and	
income	both	drop	dramatically,	while	their	expenses	rocket.	
	
The	question	that	confronts	us	here	is:	do	Fred	and	Wilma	have	any	right	to	assistance	
(financial	or	otherwise)	from	anyone	else,	such	as	the	childless	Betty	and	Barney,	or,	
against	the	just	background	distribution	(and	in	the	absence	of	voluntary	assistance	
from	others)	must	they	bear	all	the	costs	for	their	choice	to	have	a	child?	The	literature	
identifies	two	possible	positions.	Either	Fred	and	Wilma	must	bear	all	the	costs	
(Parents	Pay),	or	non-parents	like	Barney	and	Betty	must	help	them	out	(Society	Pays).	
But	Pebbles	seems	to	be	ignored.	She	is,	after	all,	just	a	child	–	she’s	not	an	agent,	she	
can’t	be	responsible	for	anything.	
	
In	terms	of	why	Fred	and	Wilma	should	bear	the	costs,	the	argument	is	relatively	
simple.	There	are	clearly	duties	that	Pebbles	be	cared	for,	such	that	she	will	have	an	
acceptable	life,	and	they	created	those	duties.	Whilst	they	may	need	to	involve	others,	
such	as	professional	teachers	and	doctors,	in	her	upbringing,	Fred	and	Wilma	are	
ultimately	liable	for	the	costs.	
	
To	see	the	force	of	this	position,	consider	an	alternative	case	in	which,	instead	of	
having	a	baby,	Fred	and	Wilma	decide	to	get	a	pet,	Dino.	(In	order	to	keep	the	cases	as	
similar	as	possible,	imagine	that	Fred	and	Wilma	arranged	for	Dino’s	parents	to	meet	
and	mate,	such	that	they	are	responsible	for	the	very	existence	of	Dino.)	Could	they	
demand	that	Betty	and	Barney	help	them	out	with	the	costs	of	pet	food,	chew	toys	and	
vets’	bills?	Or,	would	we	not	say	that	having	Dino	is	Fred	and	Wilma’s	private	project,	
one	that	they	undertook	without	consulting	Betty	and	Barney,	and	therefore	one	that	
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they	must	bear	the	costs	of	from	their	antecedently	fair	share?	Some	people	think	of	
the	project	of	child-rearing	(whilst	of	course	being	importantly	different	in	many	
ways8)	as	the	same	as	having	a	(particularly	demanding	and	costly)	pet	when	it	comes	
to	distributing	the	costs:	those	who	voluntarily	begin	the	project	must	bear	the	costs.	
	
Many	will	think	this	is	too	demanding	on	parents.	Is	it	really	true	that	schools	and	
children’s	hospitals	should	be	ideally	entirely	parent-funded?9	Or	that	state-funded	
paid	parental	leave	is	(against	a	just	background	distribution)	an	affront	to	justice?	
	
Against	this	Parents	Pay	view,	the	argument	usually	put	forward	is	that	we	will	all	
benefit	from	the	existence	of	future	generations,	and	so,	for	reasons	of	fairness,	must	
contribute	toward	raising	them.10	This	argument	is	open	to	two	distinct	forms	of	
attack.	First,	there	is	an	empirical	premise	–	that	a	next	generation	will	be	beneficial	–	
which	can	be	questioned	(see	Casal	1999,	pp.	370-373).	Second,	even	if	the	empirical	
premise	is	true	(or	granted	arguendo),	the	moral	argument	is	open	to	theoretical	
attack.	
	
The	argument	that	non-parents	should	contribute	because	they	will	benefit	from	there	
being	a	next	generation	relies	on	the	principle	of	fair	play,	or	something	like	it.	As	
Rawls	explains	the	intuitive	idea	of	fair	play,	‘We	are	not	to	gain	from	the	cooperative	
labors	of	others	without	doing	our	fair	share’	(1999,	p.	96;	cf.	Hart	1955,	p.	185).	Yet	the	
principle	of	fair	play	is	notoriously	hard	to	defend	in	its	widest	interpretations,	since	it	
allows	that	we	can	‘foist	benefits’	on	non-consenting	parties	and	then	ask	them	to	
contribute	toward	the	costs	of	those	benefits,	which	in	certain	cases	is	highly	counter-
                                                
8	Even	though	nobody	would	want	to	deny	that	child-rearing	and	pet	ownership	are	
importantly	different	activities,	neutralist	liberals	will	struggle	to	point	to	anything	inherent	in	
the	activity	that	renders	the	former	more	worthy	of	state	support	–	both	are	parts	of	
individuals’	conceptions	of	the	good.	
9	To	say	that	parents	should	bear	the	costs	is	not	necessarily	to	say	that	parents	should	bear	the	
costs	of	their	particular	children.	Matthew	Clayton	(2006,	pp.	67-68)	argues	that	the	costs	of	
childrearing	should	be	distributed	among	parents	on	a	hypothetical	insurance	model.	
10	Paul	Bou-Habib	(2013)	has	recently	provided	an	alternative	argument	for	Society	Pays,	based	
on	hypothetical	insurance	that	almost	all	members	of	society	(including	non-parents)	would	
buy	in	order	to	secure	the	opportunity	to	parent	adequately.	Whilst	Bou-Habib’s	argument	
differs	from	the	standard	‘fair	play’	arguments	in	seeing	the	benefit	in	question	as	‘the	
opportunity	to	parent	adequately’	rather	than	‘a	next	generation’,	it	shares	certain	assumptions	
with	the	standard	argument:	that	in	distributing	the	costs	of	raising	the	next	generation,	the	
potentially	liable	parties	are	current	parents	and	non-parents	(p.	200);	and	that	non-parents	are	
liable	because	they	(in	Bou-Habib’s	case,	ex	ante)	benefit	from	the	child-rearing	process	as	
adults.	
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intuitive	–	Nozick	(1974,	pp.	90-95)	famously	subjected	an	unrestricted	version	of	fair	
play	to	withering	criticism	(cf.	Rakowski	1991,	pp.	153-154).	If	foisting	benefits	on	to	
non-consenting	third	parties	is	to	generate	fair	play	obligations,	it	must	be	in	a	very	
select	set	of	circumstances	and/or	for	a	very	select	type	of	benefits.	The	question	for	
advocates	of	the	Society	Pays	view,	then,	is	whether	Betty	and	Barney’s	situation	is	of	
the	relevant	type.	Much	of	the	literature	has	focussed	on	this	question.11	
	
Foisting	Benefits	on	Children	
The	principle	of	fair	play	is	invoked	to	argue	that	Betty	and	Barney	should	contribute	
toward	raising	Pebbles.	However,	if	we	are	looking	for	parties	other	than	Fred	and	
Wilma	who	may	have	to	contribute,	especially	on	the	grounds	that	they	benefit	from	
Pebbles	being	raised,	Betty	and	Barney	are	far	from	the	most	obvious	candidates.	
Pebbles,	I	submit,	looks	a	better	bet.	The	person	who	most	obviously	benefits	from	
Pebbles	being	raised	is	Pebbles	herself.	After	all,	if	Pebbles	were	not	raised,	if	she	was	
left	helpless	and	unfed,	or	was	brought	up	without	receiving	the	instruction	and	
support	necessary	for	her	to	develop	the	physical,	intellectual,	emotional	and	social	
capacities	that	are	required	for	an	acceptable	life,	then	we	would	consider	Pebbles	as	
an	adult	to	have	been	severely	harmed,	and	to	have	not	received	essential	benefits	that	
she	was	entitled	to.	All	Fred	and	Wilma’s	expense	and	hardship	is	undertaken	for	
Pebbles	–	she’s	the	primary	and	intended	recipient	of	the	costly	benefits	in	question.	
	
Thus,	on	the	basis	that	we	sometimes	have	to	contribute	when	we	have	benefited,	it	
may	be	the	case	that	Pebbles	can	be	asked	to	contribute	to	institutions	or	schemes	that	
have	benefited	her	by	raising	her.	To	some,	this	may	sound	a	lot	like	the	Society	Pays	
view,	introduced	above.	Since	all	members	of	society	were	children	once,	if	we	pay	for	
children	on	this	backward-looking	basis,	then	it	remains	true	that	society	pays.	In	
some	ways	this	is	correct,	and	at	the	policy-level	Kids	Pay	and	Society	Pays	may	look	
very	similar.	There	will,	however,	be	policy-level	differences	between	the	view	I	argue	
for	here	and	a	pure	Society	Pays	view,	where	only	the	future	benefits	that	current	
children	will	provide	justify	contributions	from	society.	For	example,	on	the	Society	
Pays	view,	all	current	members	of	a	society	who	stand	to	benefit	in	the	future	would	
pay.	On	the	Kids	Pay	view,	however	(if	the	world	can	justly	be	organised	into	a	series	of	
independent	states)	then	taxes	should	be	lower	for	immigrants,	since	even	though	they	
                                                
11	For	arguments	that	it	is	not,	see:	Casal	and	Williams	1995,	p.	106;	and	Casal	1999,	pp.	367-368.	
For	replies,	see:	Olsaretti	2013,	239-247;	Boran	2006.	
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stand	to	benefit	from	the	current	generation	of	children,	they	did	not	benefit	from	a	
childhood	in	our	society.	Relatedly,	on	my	view,	we	should	tax	those	who	have	
emigrated	from	our	states,	having	benefited	from	being	raised	in	our	jurisdiction.	
Similarly,	those	who	have	not	(fully)	benefited	from	raising	(i.e.,	those	who	were	not	
given	goods	which	they	were	owed	when	they	were	children),	but	will	benefit	in	the	
future	from	current	children,	would	be	fully	liable	on	the	Society	Pays	view	but	would	
not	be	liable,	or	have	a	lesser	liability,	on	the	Kids	Pay	view.12	In	addition,	the	
conditions	under	which	obligations	to	contribute	exist	will	differ	–	on	Society	Pays,	I	
must	contribute	only	if	I	will	benefit	from	the	next	generation,	whilst	on	Kids	Pay	I	
must	contribute	only	if	I	benefited	from	being	raised.	The	Kids	Pay	view,	therefore,	
applies	in	a	wider	range	of	circumstances.	
	
The	most	important	difference	between	the	two	views,	however,	is	not	at	the	policy-
level,	but	concerns	the	justification	offered	for	societal	contributions	–	one	is	forward-
looking	(we	will	benefit)	whilst	my	suggestion	is	backward-looking	(we	did	benefit).	
This	backward-looking	argument	is	not,	so	far	as	I	know,	a	position	explored	in	any	
depth	in	the	existing	literature13,	where	the	focus	is	on	seeing	children	either	as	an	
expensive	choice	or	as	a	public	good.	
	
In	presenting	the	Kids	Pay	view,	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	there	is	nothing	at	all	to	
be	said	for	the	alternative	views.	I	want	to	argue	that	the	receipt	of	goods	necessary	for	
an	acceptable	life	in	childhood	is	a	basis	of	liability	for	the	costs	of	raising	children.	
This	is	compatible	with	the	choices	of	parents	and	the	future	benefits	of	children	also	
being	bases	of	liability.	This	opens	up	the	possibility	of	hybrid	positions,	in	which	the	
costs	of	raising	children	are	divided	between	the	groups	identified	taking	into	
consideration	a	plurality	of	the	differing	grounds	presented.	(Indeed,	if	Kids	Pay	is	
justified,	I	think	it	will	most	likely	be	justified	in	a	hybrid	between	Kids	Pay	and	
Parents	Pay,	since	I	think	childhood	can	be	conceived	of	as	a	mutually	beneficial	
project	between	parents	and	children,	the	costs	of	which	should	be	fairly	shared	
between	the	primary	beneficiaries.)	I	only	oppose	the	other	views,	in	the	present	
                                                
12	I	am	grateful	to	José	Luis	Martí	and	Alex	Gregory	for	encouraging	me	to	advertise	this	
attractive	element	of	the	theory	presented	here.	
13	One	version	of	the	Kids	Pay	model	–	where	children	receive	goods	from	and	pay	back	their	
own	parents	through	caring	for	them	when	elderly	–	is	briefly	mentioned	by	Axel	P.	Gosseries	
(2006,	p.	769)	in	his	review	of	Anne	L.	Alstott’s	book	No	Exit.	Below	I	argue	against	this	
particular	version	(see	the	section	‘Sharing	the	Costs’).	
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paper,	to	the	extent	that	they	are	presented	as	the	only	basis	of	liability	and	thus	
exclude	all	others	(see	also	Bou-Habib	2013,	p.	198).	
	
For	my	argument	to	go	through,	we	must	be	able	to	justifiably	foist	the	benefits	of	
being	raised	on	Pebbles,	and	demand	payment	later.	As	we	know	from	debates	about	
Society	Pays,	and	the	principle	of	fair	play	more	generally,	benefit-foisting	is	hard	to	
justify,	and	can	only	be	justified	in	certain	circumstances.	The	question	for	my	Kids	
Pay	view,	then,	is	whether	Pebbles’	situation	is	of	the	right	type.	As	I	will	now	try	to	
show,	I	think	that	both	the	type	of	benefits	that	she	receives,	and	the	situation	in	
which	she	receives	them,	make	Pebbles’	case	one	in	which	benefit-foisting	can	be	
justified.	
	
Let’s	begin	with	the	situation	that	Pebbles	is	in.	My	argument	here	is	that	the	situation	
that	Pebbles	is	in	when	she	receives	the	goods	essential	for	an	acceptable	life	is	special,	
and	that	it	plays	a	similar	role	to	that	which	‘public	goods’	usually	play	in	legitimating	
benefit-foisting.	A	commonly-placed	restriction	on	the	principle	of	fair	play	is	that	
receipt	of	benefits	generates	obligations	to	contribute	only	when	the	goods	in	question	
are	public	goods	(Arneson	1982).	An	example	of	a	public	good	is	clean	air.	For	our	
purposes	here,	clean	air	has	two	important	features	–	it	is	both	non-excludable	and	
non-avoidable.	It	is	non-excludable	because	the	distributors	cannot	exclude	non-
contributors	–	I	can’t	make	sure	that	you	get	clean	air	but	that	your	neighbour	does	
not.14	It	is	non-avoidable	because	recipients	cannot	decide	whether	or	not	to	accept	the	
good	–	if	I	am	providing	clean	air	to	you,	your	neighbour	cannot	choose	whether	or	
not	to	accept	the	good.	If	you	have	it,	so	must	she.	
	
In	general,	it	seems	sensible	that	the	principle	of	fair	play	is	restricted	to	public	goods.	
When	goods	are	excludable	we	can	simply	target	the	goods	to	only	those	who	are	
                                                
14	It	is	sometimes	observed	the	benefits	can	be	non-excludable	in	two	distinct	ways	–	physically	
or	morally	(e.g.,	White	2003,	p.	61).	This	is	not	a	fundamental	distinction	–	all	non-excludable	
benefits	are	ultimately	morally	non-excludable,	since	we	can	physically	prevent	anyone	from	
enjoying	any	benefit	(e.g.,	clean	air)	by	killing	them,	but	are	not	permitted	to	do	so.	The	
distinction	is	better	thought	of	as	one	of	degree	–	whether	non-excludability	is	based	more	on	
moral	or	practical	considerations.	A	more	pertinent	distinction	here	is	between	goods	that	we	
must	ensure	people	receive	(‘unconditional	goods’	–	see	n.	18	below)	and	those	we	cannot	
exclude	people	from.	The	goods	Pebbles	receives	are	unconditional.	
  9	
willing	to	contribute.15	And	when	goods	are	avoidable,	only	those	who	are	prepared	to	
contribute	should	accept	the	goods,	and	acceptance	might	be	taken	to	be	consent.	Yet	
the	benefits	of	being	raised	are	not	public	goods	in	this	sense.	The	benefits	provided	to	
Pebbles	are	easily	physically	excludable	–	Fred	and	Wilma	could	easily	exclude	Pebbles	
from	receiving	benefits	like	food	and	shelter.	And	the	goods	are,	in	principle,	
avoidable.	There	is	nothing	inherent	in	the	good	of	an	education,	for	example,	which	
means	that	it	could	not	be	refused,	and	the	same	applies	to	healthcare,	housing	and	so	
on.	However,	what	seems	to	matter	about	public	goods	is	that	we	cannot	seek	the	
consent	of	potential	beneficiaries,	or	restrict	the	goods	to	those	who	are	prepared	to	
contribute.	It	is	not	possible	for	people	to	opt	in	or	to	opt	out.	Consent	should	be	
preferred,	but	it	just	isn’t	possible	with	public	goods.	
	
Once	we	see	that	this	is	why	it	is	appropriate	to	restrict	the	principle	of	fair	play	to	
public	goods,	we	can	see	that	in	Pebbles’	case,	even	though	the	goods	in	question	are	
not	public	goods,	her	situation	is	importantly	similar	to	cases	where	public	goods	are	
provided,	since	Pebbles	is	not,	in	the	proper	sense,	available	to	seek	consent	from	
when	the	benefits	are	given	to	her.	We	could	not	ask	a	newborn	Pebbles	whether	she	
wanted	to	be	clothed	and	fed.	And	while	we	could	ask	a	four	year	old	Pebbles	whether	
she	wanted	to	go	to	school,	or	take	her	medicine	and	so	on,	it	was	not	possible	for	her	
to	give	a	responsibility-generating	response,	for	four	year	olds	are	not	full	agents,	they	
are	proto-agents.	The	argument	here	is	that	we	can	justify	foisting	certain	types	of	
benefits	on	proto-agents,	because	they	are	not	in	a	position	to	accept	or	refuse	them,	
so	the	benefit	cannot	be	provided	only	to	willing	contributors.	
	
To	see	how	the	unavailability	of	an	agent	can	render	the	foisting	of	an	easily	
excludable	and	avoidable	good	permissible,	consider	the	following	example:	
Matrix:	As	in	the	film	The	Matrix,	people	are	involuntarily	plugged	into	an	
experience	machine,	and	thus	deprived	of	their	agency.	A	scheme	is	set	up	to	
release	them	from	this	machine-based	tyranny,	but	it	is	costly.	We	cannot	ask	
those	people	who	will	benefit	from	the	scheme	if	they	are	prepared	to	
contribute,	because	they	do	not	currently	have	their	agency	and	therefore	are	
                                                
15	Given	this	restriction,	the	advocate	of	Society	Pays	needs	to	show	that	the	benefits	of	a	next	
generation	are	non-excludable	and/or	non-avoidable.	It	is	not	obvious	to	me	that	they	are,	at	
least	physically.	See	Olsaretti	2013,	pp.	250-258.	
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unable	to	give	responsibility-generating	responses.	However,	we	are	able	to	
rescue	some	and	not	others	–	the	benefit	is	easily	(physically)	excludable.	
	
Even	though	this	benefit	is	excludable,	it	does	not	seem	unreasonable	to	say	that	once	
the	enslaved	people	are	released	we	can	ask	them	to	help	pay	the	costs	of	the	scheme	
that	they	have	been	the	beneficiaries	of.	We	were	not	able	to	get	consent	from	the	
enslaved	persons,	and	then	only	benefit	those	who	were	willing	to	pay	their	fair	share.	
Due	to	the	situation	they	were	in,	the	normal	rules	of	requiring	permission	before	
foisting	a	private/excludable	benefit	are	suspended.	Children	are	in	an	analogous	
situation	–	they	benefit	from	being	raised,	but	we	cannot	ask	them	if	they	are	prepared	
to	benefit	from,	or	to	contribute	toward	the	costs	of,	that	scheme,	because	they	are	not	
yet	agents	who	can	give	responsibility-generating	responses.	And	we	cannot	wait	for	
our	children	or	our	Matrix-imprisoned	people	to	become	able	to	give	responsibility-
generating	responses,	as	they	require	the	benefits	we	want	to	give	them	in	order	to	
become	the	kinds	of	agents	who	can	give	such	responses.	
	
It	seems,	then,	that	when	people	are	in	circumstances	that	preclude	the	possibility	of	
us	asking	permission	from	them	(or	waiting	to	ask	permission	from	them),	then	the	
chances	of	benefit-foisting	being	permissible	are	significantly	increased.	But	this	can’t	
be	true	for	any	kind	of	benefit.	For	example,	a	passing	hairdresser	couldn’t	give	our	
Matrix-imprisoned	agents	a	tidying	snip	and	demand	to	be	paid	once	they	woke	up.	
That	could	have	waited,	and	it	isn’t	the	kind	of	essential	benefit	that	can	break	the	
normal	presumption	against	the	mere	receipt	of	benefits	being	obligation-generating.	
	
The	principle	of	fair	play,	then,	must	be	restricted	to	certain	kinds	of,	morally	
distinctive,	goods.	George	Klosko	(1987,	p.	247)	argues	that	the	principle	of	fair	play	is	
restricted	to	those	goods	that	‘can	be	presumed	to	be	necessary	for	an	acceptable	life’.16	
Benefit-foisting	can	only	be	legitimate	when	our	most	fundamental	interests	are	at	
stake	(as	in	Matrix).	In	the	case	of	raising	children,	there	are	several	aspects	to	the	
task,	and	these	will	require	the	provision	of	different	kinds	of	goods.	Some	are	non-
                                                
16	Klosko	calls	these	‘presumptive	benefits’.	This	leaves	the	theory	open	to	an	epistemic	
interpretation	whereby	what	matters	is	that	we	know	that	you	benefited,	which	may	make	it	
seem	that	hypothetical	consent	is	what	is	doing	the	work.	I	think	that	the	Matrix	hairdresser	
case	shows	this	interpretation	is	flawed.	Even	if	she	knows	she	is	benefiting	the	prisoners,	and	
that	they	would	have	paid,	the	good	is	not	of	sufficient	importance.	Some	of	these	questions	
about	Klosko’s	theory	are	raised	in	McDermott	2004.	I	am	grateful	to	a	Political	Studies	referee	
for	encouraging	me	to	address	this	interpretation.	
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essential,	but	there	are	also	goods	that	we	receive,	and	have	a	right	to,	on	the	basis	that	
they	are	essential	parts	of	the	job	of	raising	us	such	that	they	‘can	be	presumed	
necessary	for	an	acceptable	life’,	and	the	adult	who	goes	on	to	have	that	acceptable	life	
benefits	from	having	received	those.	These	are	the	kinds	of	goods,	I	suggest,	that	we	
can	ask	Pebbles	to	contribute	toward.		Some	may	think	that	this	weakens	the	case	for	
foisting	–	if	Pebbles	is	owed	the	goods	necessary	for	an	acceptable	life,	how	can	we	ask	
her	to	pay	for	them?	The	response	is	simple:	she	must	have	them,	but	it	doesn’t	follow	
that	she	must	have	them	for	free	(Casal	1999,	pp.	369-370).	National	defence	is	a	good	
example	of	where	this	is	the	case.	The	state	ought	to	provide	it	for	us,	but	it	doesn’t	
follow	that	we	have	no	obligation	to	contribute.	
	
If	the	above	arguments	are	right,	then	excludable	and	avoidable	benefits	provided	
without	consent	can	generate	obligations	if17:	
(1) They	are	essential	goods	necessary	for	an	acceptable	life;	
(2) The	recipient	was	not	available	to	give	consent;	and	
(3) It	was	not	possible	or	reasonable	to	wait	for	the	agent	to	become	so	available.	
	
We	can	see	that	each	of	these	conditions	applies	to	Pebbles.	First,	many	of	the	things	
we	receive	from	our	parents	and	institutions,	especially	in	our	early	years,	are	geared	
toward,	and	are	necessary	for,	our	developing	such	that	we	are	able	to	enjoy	an	
acceptable	life.	Second,	Pebbles	is	not	yet	an	agent,	and	so	cannot	accept	or	refuse	
obligation-generating	benefits.	Finally,	it	is	not	possible	to	wait	for	Pebbles	to	become	
an	agent	before	delivering	these	benefits,	as	they	must	be	provided	in	childhood,	
before	she	becomes	an	agent.	
	
In	accordance	with	(3),	two	kinds	of	goods	may	be	foisted	upon	Pebbles.	Since	her	
liability	to	contribute	toward	foisted	benefits	is	due	to	a	combination	of	her	lack	of	
agency	and	the	essential	nature	of	the	goods,	then	she	can	justly	be	asked	to	
contribute	toward	(a)	goods	essential	for	reaching	full	agency,	and	(b)	goods	not	
essential	for	reaching	full	agency,	but	which	are	essential	for	a	minimally	decent	life	
and	which	can	only	be	reasonably	provided	prior	to	full	moral	agency.	All	other	
essential	goods	which	could	be	provided	prior	to	full	moral	agency,	but	which	could	
                                                
17	Note	that	I	do	not	say	‘and	only	if’.	
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reasonably	be	provided	later,	are	not	foistable,	as	it	would	be	reasonable	to	wait	to	
seek	consent.	
	
Parents	as	Beneficiaries	
My	argument	relies	on	the	principle	of	fair	play.	In	response	to	fair	play	arguments	
pressed	in	the	service	of	the	Society	Pays	view	Paula	Casal	and	Andrew	Williams	have	
suggested	several	conditions	which	restrict	the	principle’s	applicability.	One	is	
especially	relevant	here.18	It	can	be	described	as	follows:	
The	Costs	Condition:	benefit-foisting	can	generate	obligations	only	if	the	
producer	bears	costs	in	producing	the	benefit.	
	
As	Casal	and	Williams	point	out,	people	don’t	generally	consider	having	children	to	be	
an	all-things-considered	cost.19	Therefore,	in	the	same	way	that	Betty	and	Barney,	
according	to	Casal	and	Williams,	can	legitimately	reject	Fred	and	Wilma’s	pleas	for	
assistance	on	fair	play	considerations,	perhaps	Pebbles	can	too.	If	Fred	and	Wilma	
regard	themselves	as	all-things-considered	better	off	with	Pebbles	in	their	lives	(even	
with	all	the	expense),	how	can	they	seek	assistance	for	the	burden?	
	
This	objection	from	the	costs	condition	is	only	valid	if	we	interpret	the	condition	in	a	
certain	way.	The	objection	only	succeeds	when	the	relevant	test	is	whether	‘parenting’,	
viewed	as	a	single	transaction,	is	all-things-considered	beneficial.	But	neither	of	the	
following	is	obvious:	(1)	that	parenting	need	be	viewed	as	a	single	transaction;	(2)	that	
whether	producers	are	all-things-considered	benefited	is	the	relevant	test.	
	
On	(1),	parenting	involves	thousands	of	discrete	tasks	and	interactions,	spread	over	
many	years,	producing	many	different,	and	different	kinds	of,	benefit	–	why	must	we	
lump	them	all	together?	Yes,	aspects	of	raising	a	child	are	beneficial,	but	some	are	
                                                
18	Casal	(1999,	pp.	367-370)	and	Casal	and	Williams	(1995,	pp.	106-107)	suggest	two	other	
restrictions	on	fair	play	obligations	–	that	the	benefiter	intends	to	benefit	the	recipient,	and	that	
the	goods	provided	are	unconditional	(i.e.,	the	goods’	importance	are	not	reducible	to	the	
producers’	preferences	–	in	other	words,	are	morally	required).	Since	the	goods	in	question	here	
are	clearly	provided	with	Pebbles	in	mind,	and	are	morally	required,	neither	of	these	posited	
conditions	is	violated	by	Kids	Pay.	For	discussion	of	the	intentions	condition,	see	Boran	2006	
and	Olsaretti	2013,	pp.	245-247.	
19	Interestingly,	Casal	and	Williams	(1995)	proposed	the	Costs	Condition	in	the	course	of	an	
investigation	of	the	issue	of	parental	subsidies	from	within	the	perspective	of	Ronald	Dworkin’s	
‘equality	of	resources’	theory	(Dworkin	2000).	Yet	if	resources	are	the	correct	metric	of	justice,	
then	children	may	well	be	an	all-things-considered	cost.	
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burdensome	(such	as	paying	for	a	doctor,	or	childcare),	and	while	some	of	the	
burdensome	aspects	are	necessary	to	access,	and	are	closely	related	to,	the	goods	of	
parenting,	some	are	not	–	they	are	just	burdensome	tasks	in	the	purest	sense	of	the	
term.	If	we	divide	parenting	up	into	a	series	of	tasks,	parents	can	claim	compensation	
for	the	truly	burdensome	(but	essential)	bits,	and	not	for	the	beneficial	bits.	
	 	
On	(2),	even	if	‘parenting’	should	be	subject	to	a	singular	cost-benefit	analysis,	just	
because	an	activity	is	an	all-things-considered	benefit	to	the	producers	of	some	
benefits,	this	does	not	show	that	burdens	are	not	undertaken	in	producing	the	good.20	
Even	if	parents	overall	benefit	from	raising	children,	it	is	still	plainly	the	case	that	costs	
are	borne.	The	‘costs	condition’	is	only	violated	if	we	interpret	it	not	as	requiring	that	
costs	are	borne,	but	that	the	activity	is	all-things-considered	costly.	I	think	we	should	
reject	this	interpretation	of	the	condition,	since	sometimes	activities	that	are	beneficial	
for	the	provider	of	goods	also	benefit	others	in	ways	that	are	unfair.	In	such	cases,	the	
costs	could	be	shared	more	fairly	between	beneficiary	and	provider,	making	them	all-
things-considered	more	beneficial	for	the	provider.	The	principle	of	fair	play	can	apply	
even	when	the	producer	is	overall	better	off	for	producing	the	good.	
	
To	explain,	consider	this	example.	
Protection:	Ten	people	out	of	a	town	of	one	hundred	undertake	to	protect	the	
town	from	some	external	threat.	This	protection	will	benefit	each	person	in	the	
town	by	eleven	units.	The	cost	of	providing	this	protection	is	ten	units	each	for	
the	ten	members	willing	to	protect	the	town.	
Each	of	the	protectors	must	view	the	protection	as	an	all-things-considered	benefit,	as	
things	stand,	as	they’re	each	one	unit	better	off.	But	we	shouldn’t	think	that	that	fact	
establishes	that	the	rest	of	the	town	aren’t	the	kind	of	free-riders	condemned	by	the	
principle	of	fair	play,	because	they’re	benefiting	more	(even	though,	and	indeed	
precisely	because,	they	don’t	put	anything	in).	They	get	eleven	units	for	nothing,	whilst	
those	putting	in	all	the	effort	get	a	net	benefit	of	one.	This	seems	like	exactly	the	kind	
of	situation	the	principle	of	fair	play	is	supposed	to	condemn	–	some	are	providing	
essential	goods	(protection)	and	others	are	benefiting	without	contributing.	
	
                                                
20	For	arguments	along	similar	lines,	see	Olsaretti	2013,	pp.	242-245.	
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Given	this,	I	don’t	think	that	the	costs	condition	should	be	read	as	being	one	which	
means	that	whenever	providers	of	goods	all-things-considered	benefit,	they	are	not	
entitled	to	contributions	from	other	beneficiaries.	And	if	that	is	the	case,	the	condition	
is	not	violated	in	Pebbles’	case.	
	
However,	viewing	things	this	way	reminds	us	of	something	important	–	parents	benefit	
from	the	childrearing	project	too.	The	idea	here	is	to	make	the	burdens	of	childrearing	
more	fairly	shared	by	asking	a	primary	beneficiary	–	the	child	–	to	contribute,	not	to	
shift	the	burdens	entirely	to	the	child.	One	way	to	see	the	parent-child	relationship	is	
as	a	mutually	beneficial	project21,	the	costs	of	which	must	be	shared	(fairly)	between	
the	primary	beneficiaries.22	
	
Parental	Responsibility	for	Existence	
There	is	of	course	a	key	difference	between	cases	(like	Matrix)	where	someone	requires	
essential	goods	and	nobody	is	responsible	for	the	person	being	in	need,	and	cases	
where	identifiable	individuals	are	responsible	for	the	person	requiring	the	goods	in	the	
first	place.	For	example,	consider	the	following	case:	
Bart	harms	Lisa:	Bart	intentionally	and	wrongfully	knocks	out	Lisa	and	she	falls	
into	a	coma.	As	a	result,	she	requires	expensive	medical	care.	
	
In	this	case,	Bart	is	responsible	for	Lisa	being	in	need,	and	so	must	pay	the	costs	of	
meeting	those	needs	–	the	fair	play	principle	won’t	apply.	Lisa	is	not	(one	of)	the	
primary	duty-bearer(s)	for	paying	the	costs,	even	though	the	following	conditions	
                                                
21	Some	have	objected	to	this	picture	of	the	parent-child	relationship.	They	think	that	we	should	
think	of	the	essential	things	that	we	give	to	our	children	as	gifts.	I	can	see	the	appeal	of	this	way	
of	thinking,	but	such	a	view	actually	presupposes	the	Kids	Pay	view,	rather	than	undermining	it.	
Gifts	require	discretion	–	there	must	be	something	optional	about	a	gift	(for	example,	
compensation	cannot	qualify	as	a	gift).	Gifts	can	be	things	that	we	may	choose	whether	or	not	
to	give,	but	the	unconditional	goods	that	we	are	considering	here	cannot	be	gifts	in	that	sense.	
Another	way	in	which	something	may	be	considered	a	gift	is	when	we	must	give	someone	the	
thing	in	question,	but	would	be	entitled	to	ask	for	some	recompense	and	choose	not	to.	The	
things	we	give	our	kids	could	be	considered	gifts	in	this	sense	–	things	that	we	must	give,	but	
could,	and	choose	not	to,	charge	for.	However	that	relies	on	our	having	the	right	to	charge	for	
them,	which	in	turn	relies	on	the	children	being	liable.	Therefore,	those	who	wish	to	think	of	
the	things	we	give	to	our	children	(either	as	parents	or	as	a	political	collective)	as	gifts	must	
accept	the	argument	presented	here,	and	then	make	a	further	argument,	showing	that	we	
ought	not	to	claim	that	which	we	are	owed.	I	am	grateful	to	Andrew	Williams,	Paul	Bou-Habib,	
and	a	Political	Studies	referee	for	pressing	this	objection.	
22	And	possibly	others	as	well.	As	I	made	clear	above,	the	idea	here	is	to	identify	an	ignored	
basis	of	liability,	not	replace	those	already	argued	for.	I	am	grateful	to	Zofia	Stemplowska	for	
useful	comments	here.	
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hold:	she	is	the	primary	beneficiary	of	the	medical	care;	the	goods	she	receives	are	
essential;	she	isn’t	available	to	seek	consent	from;	and	we	cannot	wait	for	her	to	
become	available.	Therefore,	even	though	Bart	harms	Lisa	has	these	structural	
similarities	with	Matrix	we	reach	a	different	conclusion,	because	an	identifiable	
individual	(Bart)	is	responsible	for	creating	the	needs	in	the	first	place.	
	
This	is	important	because	while	the	goods	that	Pebbles	receives	are	essential,	she	is	
not	responsible	for	the	creation	of	the	need	for	someone	to	benefit	her	–	Fred	and	
Wilma	are.	Prior	to	Pebbles	needing	to	be	taken	from	childhood	to	adulthood	(the	
costs	of	which	are	our	primary	focus	here)	she	was	taken	from	non-existence	to	
childhood.	And,	as	I	reminded	my	own	parents	many	times	during	my	teenage	years,	
we	don’t	ask	to	be	born.	So,	given	that	Fred	and	Wilma	create	the	need	for	Pebbles	to	
receive	essential	goods,	are	they	rightly	held	liable	for	the	costs,	as	Bart	is	when	he	
knocks	Lisa	unconscious?	
	
Whether	this	is	the	case	is	going	to	turn	on	how	we	answer	some	very	difficult	
questions	about	what	it	is	that	parents	do	to	children	when	they	create	them.	This	will	
raise	difficult	issues	about	the	metaphysics	of	non-existence	and	existence,	and	harms	
and	benefits,	how	we	should	think	about	compensation,	and	the	nature	of	childhood.23	
I	cannot,	in	this	paper,	hope	to	go	into	the	kind	of	depth	that	all	these	issues	require,	
but	I	can	identify	which	positions	seem	to	support	and,	more	importantly,	which	
undermine,	the	position	investigated	in	this	paper.	
	
In	order	to	see	why	what	it	is	that	we	do	when	we	bring	someone	into	existence	
matters	here,	recall	the	above	Bart	harms	Lisa	example,	and	contrast	it	with	this	case:	
Bart	saves	Lisa:	Lisa	is	drowning,	and	no	one	is	responsible	for	her	being	in	this	
situation.	Saving	her	is	so	dangerous	that	no	one	is	obligated	to	do	so.	Bart	
dives	in,	nevertheless,	to	save	her.	Once	on	the	bank	of	the	river,	Lisa	requires	
essential	and	expensive	medical	treatment.	
	
                                                
23	Much	of	the	literature	on	the	ethics	of	procreation	focuses	on	trying	to	establish	what,	if	
anything,	is	harmful	and/or	wrongful	in	cases	involving	the	‘non-identity	problem’,	which	are	
not	my	focus	here.	I	am	focused	on	the	‘ordinary	case’	where	the	creators	of	the	child	have	no	
good	reason	to	believe	she	will	suffer	any	problems	beyond	those	of	ordinary	existence.	On	
non-identity	cases	see:	Parfit	1984,	Part	IV;	McMahan	1998.	
  16	
Here	we	have	another	example	where	Bart	is	responsible	for	Lisa	being	in	a	situation	
where	others	are	required	to	provide	her	with	expensive	essential	goods.	Prior	to	Bart’s	
intervention,	nobody	was	required	to	assist	Lisa,	and	now	they	are,	and	her	needs	are	
expensive.	Therefore,	Bart	is	responsible	for	the	existence	of	these	obligations,	but,	
unlike	in	Bart	harms	Lisa,	Bart	is	not	the	primary	duty-bearer	for	meeting	those	costs.	
Bart	benefited	Lisa	in	a	way	that	he	was	under	no	obligation	to.	The	state	that	that	
benefit	took	Lisa	to	created	(costly)	obligations	of	assistance,	but	it	doesn’t	follow	that	
Bart	must	bear	the	costs	of	those	obligations	being	fulfilled.	
	
We	can	see	that	responsibility	for	the	existence	of	costly	obligations	to	benefit	people	
creates	(primary)	obligations	to	meet	those	costs	in	some	circumstances	(Bart	harms	
Lisa)	but	not	in	others	(Bart	saves	Lisa).	Since	parents	are	responsible	for	the	existence	
of	children,	they	are	responsible	for	putting	people	in	a	situation	in	which	they	need	
costly	assistance	–	costs	that	someone	needs	to	bear.	What	we	must	decide	is	whether	
Fred	and	Wilma	are	more	like	Bart	in	Bart	harms	Lisa	or	Bart	saves	Lisa	–	does	their	
responsibility	for	the	existence	of	the	costs	of	raising	Pebbles	render	them	liable	for	
meeting	those	costs?	
	
Of	course,	Fred	and	Wilma	will	not	be	exactly	like	Bart	in	either	case	–	part	of	the	
reason	that	issues	surrounding	procreation	are	so	morally	difficult	is	that	the	act	of	
bringing	someone	into	existence	is	unlike	any	other.	There	are	no	fully	analogous	
cases.	However,	we	can	point	to	the	important	differences	between	the	Bart	harms	Lisa	
and	Bart	saves	Lisa	cases	and	further	argument	will	then	need	to	establish	which	of	the	
relevant	elements	of	each	case	are	present	in	the	procreation	case.	Here,	I	will	simply	
point	to	the	kinds	of	questions	we	need	to	ask	of	the	procreation	case	in	investigating	
whether	the	Kids	Pay	view	is	an	attractive	one,	and	I	will	conditionalise	the	argument	
presented	in	this	essay	to	be	dependent	on	us	not	believing	certain	things	about	
procreation.	However,	the	stipulations	required	are	quite	modest,	and	will	be	in	tune	
with	what	most	people	believe	about	procreation	(namely,	that	we	ordinarily	do	not	
harm	people	in	causing	them	to	exist).	
	
What,	then,	are	the	key	differences	between	the	cases?	First,	in	Bart	harms	Lisa,	Bart	
harms	Lisa,	whilst	in	Bart	saves	Lisa,	Bart	improves	Lisa’s	condition.	Furthermore,	he	
does	so	even	though	he	was	not	obligated	to	do	so.	Second,	in	Bart	harms	Lisa,	Bart	
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acts	impermissibly,	whilst	in	Bart	saves	Lisa,	he	acts	permissibly.	Not	only	that,	he	acts	
in	a	manner	that	is	praiseworthy.	Third,	in	Bart	harms	Lisa,	Bart	will	owe	Lisa	
compensation	as	a	result	of	having	harmed	her,	whilst	in	Bart	saves	Lisa	he	will	not.	
We	must	decide	which	of	these	features	procreation	shares.		
	
Given	the	important	differences	between	the	two	cases,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	
argument	presented	here	will	go	through	provided	one	of	the	following	does	not	hold:	
that	parents	(1)	harm	their	offspring	in	creating	them24,	in	such	a	way	that	(2)	they	owe	
them	compensation.	Even	if	both	(1)	and	(2)	hold,	however,	the	argument	may	still	
have	some	relevance.	This	will	be	the	case	if	both	of	the	following	are	also	true:	(3)	the	
compensation	owed	is	less	than	the	cost	of	raising	children	such	that	they	will	have	an	
adequate	life25,	and	(4)	it	would	not	be	inappropriate	to	demand	the	child	take	on	
some	of	the	remaining	costs.26	The	most	important	point	here	is	that	the	argument	
survives	provided	we	do	not	harm	children	in	creating	them.	
	
Sharing	the	Costs	
The	arguments	above	outline	a	case	for	holding	people	liable	for	the	costs	of	children	
on	the	basis	of	their	status	as	ex-children.	If	the	arguments	go	through,	we	will	need	to	
decide	two	things:	first,	how	to	distribute	the	costs	of	raising	between	children;	and,	
second,	since	the	benefits	can	be	foisted	and	repayment	reclaimed	later,	who	is	
responsible	for	bearing	the	costs	in	the	interim.	I	will	now	show	that	these	two	issues	
are	importantly	interlinked,	and	will	show	how	some	problematic	answers	to	the	first	
issue	can	be	avoided	by	the	Kids	Pay	view	if	we	adopt	certain	answers	to	the	second.	
	
                                                
24	Some	think	that	we	benefit	people	by	creating	them	(when	they	have	a	life	worth	living).	
(See,	e.g.,	Parfit	1984,	p.	358	and	Appendix	G;	McMahan	1981,	pp.	104-105).	Some	think	that	we	
harm	people	by	creating	them,	either	by	giving	them	a	life	not	worth	living	(see,	e.g.,	Benatar	
2006,	cf.	Harman	2009),	or	even	when	they	have	a	life	worth	living	(see,	e.g.,	Shiffrin	1999).	
Some	think	that	we	can	neither	benefit	nor	harm	people	in	creating	them	(see,	e.g.,	Velleman	
2008a,	pp.	242-244,	and	2008b,	pp.	247-250;	Narveson	1978,	p.	48).	Although	the	literature	
generally	considers	whether	we	harm	or	benefit	people	in	creating	them,	it	is	possible	to	believe	
both	–	that	we	harm	people	in	the	short	term	by	making	them	children,	even	if	they	go	on	to	
have	lives	worth	living	overall	(and	that	is	a	benefit). 
25	This	will	be	the	case	if,	for	example,	in	creating	a	baby,	we	harm	that	baby	(by	making	her	
worse	off	than	non-existence),	and	need	to	compensate	her	by	getting	her	back	to	being	as	well	
off	as	non-existence	(the	‘neutral	level’).	If	the	neutral	level	is	below	a	minimally	decent	life,	the	
costs	of	raising	someone	from	the	neutral	level	to	a	minimally	decent	life	must	still	be	
distributed,	and	children	may	be	asked	to	contribute	to	those	costs.	
26	Whether	this	is	the	case	is	likely	to	turn	on	whether	the	harm	at	(1)	is	wrongful	or	merely	
compensation-worthy.	I	am	grateful	to	a	Political	Studies	referee	for	helpful	comments	here.	
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On	the	issue	of	how	to	distribute	costs	among	children,	it	must	be	recalled	that	what	I	
have	argued	for	here	is	that	the	receipt	of	essential	benefits	in	childhood	is	a	basis	for	
liability	for	the	costs	of	supplying	those	essential	benefits.	There	may	be	other	bases	of	
liability	and	we	must	know	what	those	are	and	how	to	balance	all	the	different	bases	
before	we	can	work	out	what	children	owe.	However,	with	that	caveat	on	the	table,	we	
can	nevertheless	look	at	one	particularly	difficult	issue.27	
	
A	major	concern	regarding	the	argument	presented	thus	far,	especially	for	egalitarians	
(broadly	conceived),	is	that	since	the	costs	of	raising	a	child	are	seemingly	chargeable	
to	that	person,	the	argument	thus	far	entails	that	people	who	are	expensive	to	raise,	
will,	through	no	fault	of	their	own,	reach	adulthood	with	a	larger	chunk	taken	from	
their	initial	stake,	or	a	larger	bill	waiting	on	their	door	mat.	Let’s	call	this	the	
‘expensive	child	objection’.28	There	are,	of	course,	some	who	will	not	be	concerned	by	
this	putative	entailment.	They	will	recognise	the	apparently	individualistic	nature	of	
this	proposal,	but	they	won’t	find	this	concerning.	Such	thinkers	may	choose	to	depart	
at	this	stop.	But	for	those	(like	me)	who	are	concerned	by	this	apparent	implication	of	
the	view,	I	will	show	why	I	do	not	think	it	is	a	necessary	entailment	of	the	Kids	Pay	
view.	
	
Imagine	that,	after	seeing	the	joy	that	Pebbles	has	brought	to	Fred	and	Wilma,	Betty	
and	Barney	also	decide	to	have	a	child,	and	they	have	Bam	Bam.	Pebbles	is	more	
expensive	to	raise	than	Bam	Bam,	as	she	has	a	lot	of	physical	ailments	that	require	
constant	visits	to	highly-skilled	and	in-demand	specialist	doctors,	and	that	all	these	
                                                
27	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	this	is	the	only	difficulty	that	Kids	Pay	faces.	Others	that	have	
been	raised	are:	(1)	some	parents/raising	schemes	are	less	efficient	(and	thus	more	costly)	than	
others;	(2)	Kids	Pay	potentially	suggests	that	we	should	pay	‘back’	to	our	parents’	generation	
and	‘forward’	to	our	children	at	the	same	time,	which	is	overly-demanding;	(3)	Kids	Pay	will	
corrupt	family	relationships,	by	‘monetarising’	the	parent-child	relationship.	I	don’t	have	the	
space	to	develop	full	responses	to	all	these	objections	here,	but	I	mostly	view	these	as	concerns	
about	specific	ways	of	instituting	the	scheme,	and	if	one	way	of	instituting	the	scheme	has	
troubling	implications,	that	is	a	good	reason	not	to	institute	it	in	that	way.	On	(1),	my	responses	
are	along	the	same	lines	as	those	that	meet	the	‘expensive	child	objection’.	On	(2),	if	everyone	
simply	‘pays	forward’,	or	if	we	spread	payments	over	a	lifetime,	then	these	objections	can	be	
met.	On	(3),	if	society	fronts	the	resources	in	the	short	term	(as	I	will	go	on	to	recommend)	
then	this	can	be	avoided.	I	am	grateful	to	a	Political	Studies	referee	and	Rob	Jubb,	Sarah	
Hannan,	Joanna	Firth,	Seth	Lazar	and	Simon	Caney	for	pressing	such	concerns.	
28	Expensive	children	raise	(prima	facie)	concerns	for	Society	Pays	and	Parents	Pay	too.	Society	
Pays,	viewed	simply,	implies	that	we	should	only	fund	those	children	who	represent	value	for	
money	(i.e.,	lifetime	net	contributors).	On	Parents	Pay,	parents	with	expensive	children	might	
be	stuck	with	greater	liability.	Those	who	wish	to	collectivise	parental	liability	can	avail	
themselves	of	similar	arguments	to	those	I	make	here	(see	Clayton	2006,	pp.	67-68).	
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trips	are	of	exactly	the	kind	that	(I	have	argued)	can	be	foisted	on	to	children.	Pebbles	
is	receiving	more	than	Bam	Bam.	Given	this,	it	might	seem	that	Pebbles	will	inevitably	
have	to	pay	more	than	Bam	Bam,	on	account	of	having	cost	more.	
	
In	order	to	deflect	this	objection,	however,	we	can	differentiate	between	some	
different	questions	that	can	be	asked	about	a	scheme	that	provides	benefits.	The	first	
is:	what	is	the	total	amount	owed?	The	second	is:	who	is	liable	and	on	what	basis?	The	
third	is:	how	should	we	divide	the	costs	between	the	liable	parties?	
	
With	regard	to	the	first,	the	total	amount	owed	is	the	total	costs	of	the	scheme,	or	the	
total	amount	of	benefit	received,	whichever	is	lower.	When	foisting	benefits,	the	
distributor	cannot	expect	to	turn	a	profit,	and	cannot	claim	for	more	than	she	has	
actually	benefited	people.	Kids	Pay	provides	an	answer	to	the	second	question	–	it	
claims	that	we	are	liable	to	contribute	to	the	raising	of	children	on	the	basis	of	having	
benefited	as	children.	But	it	does	not	follow	that	we	must	pay	for	what	we	have	each	
individually	received.	It	is	a	separate,	third,	question	as	to	how	we	should	divide	the	
costs.	Kids	Pay,	as	a	theory	of	the	basis	of	liability,	is	compatible	with	many	answers	to	
the	third	question	–	it	is	compatible	with	many	intra-children	distributions,	and	so	
takes	no	official	stance	on	the	distribution	of	burdens	between	(expensive)	Pebbles	
and	(cheap)	Bam	Bam.	And	at	this	point,	there	is	no	reason	why	we	shouldn’t	be	
concerned	with	comparative	fairness.	Indeed,	Rawls	(1999,	p.	96)	and	Arneson	(1982,	p.	
622)	qualify	the	application	of	the	principle	of	fair	play	with	the	condition	that	only	
internally	just	schemes	can	trigger	liability.	So,	not	only	are	the	basis	of	liability	and	
the	correct	distribution	of	costs	separate	issues,	liability	on	this	view	depends	on	us	
getting	the	distribution	of	costs	right.	For	those	that	think	that	asking	Pebbles	to	pay	
for	her	own	expensive	medical	care	is	objectionable,	then,	there	is	no	reason	to	think	
that	this	would	be	the	right	way	to	distribute	the	costs	among	the	beneficiaries	of	the	
child-rearing	scheme.	
	
A	natural	way	to	object	to	this	line	of	thinking	is	to	point	out	that	while	this	kind	of	
thinking	may	legitimate	fair	distributions	between	the	beneficiaries	of	the	same	
scheme,	Pebbles	and	Bam	Bam,	being	parts	of	different	family	units,	are	not	recipients	
of	benefits	from	the	same	scheme,	and	so	it	would	be	inappropriate	to	try	to	find	a	fair	
way	of	distributing	burdens	between	them.	
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However,	this	objection	to	the	idea	of	fairly	distributing	burdens	between	Pebbles	and	
Bam	Bam	is	only	successful	if	we	fund	these	benefits	in	the	short	term	in	a	certain	way.	
To	explain:	the	argument	thus	far	says	that	as	the	beneficiaries	of	raising,	children	
ought	to	contribute.	But	children	do	not	have	their	own	resources,	and	so	someone	
must	front	them	the	goods	in	the	short	term	and	then	await	repayment	–	someone	
must	be	the	foister.	Now,	if	a	child’s	own	parents	are	the	foisters,	then	the	objection	
holds	–	Pebbles	and	Bam	Bam	are	the	beneficiaries	of	discrete	schemes,	and	so	there	is	
no	just	distribution	of	the	benefits	and	burdens	within	a	single	scheme	which	can	
correct	for	the	fact	that	Pebbles	is	a	more	expensive	child.	But	why	should	we	think	of	
the	child’s	own	parents	as	the	relevant	short-term	provider?	We	could,	as	a	society,	
front	each	individual	child	the	resources	necessary,	and	then	as	a	society	seek	
repayment	later.	Or,	parents	as	a	whole	could	be	the	lenders	in	the	short	term.	Either	
of	these	solutions	would	make	Pebbles	and	Bam	Bam	the	beneficiaries	of	the	same	
scheme,	and	thus	make	it	appropriate	to	seek	a	just	distribution	of	the	burdens	of	that	
scheme.	
	
How	should	we	resolve	this	issue	of	which	scheme	size	we	should	prefer?	This	is,	so	far	
as	I	know,	an	underexplored	issue	in	the	literature	on	the	principle	of	fair	play.	
Discussions	of	the	moral	and	political	issues	raised	by	non-consensual	beneficial	
schemes	and	the	principle	of	fair	play	tend	to	focus	on	the	perspective	and	duties	of	
the	recipients	of	benefits.	But	when	we	look	at	things	from	the	perspective	of	the	
benefit-givers,	questions	about	which	of	several	possible	schemes	they	are	permitted,	
should	prefer,	or	are	obligated	to	bring	about,	arise.	If	we	can	form	any	of	the	three	
schemes	mentioned	above,	it	is	only	if	we	are	obligated	to	form	the	scheme	in	which	
parents	lend	to	their	own	children	that	the	variant	of	the	Kids	Pay	scheme	that	fuels	
the	expensive	child	objection	will	necessarily	come	about	(although	even	in	such	a	
scheme,	siblings	will	still	be	the	beneficiaries	of	the	same	scheme,	and	as	such	we	can	
ask	siblings	to	take	on	a	fair	share	of	the	burdens	of	expensive	children.)	
	
I	cannot	see	any	reason	why	we	should	think	ourselves	so	obligated.	I	think	that	there	
are	strong	moral	considerations	in	favour	of	other	scheme	sizes.	Firstly,	to	see	how	
moral	considerations	can	dictate	which	scheme	size	we	ought	to	choose,	consider:	
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Additive:	A	deadly	disease	threatens	a	community.	The	only	way	to	prevent	this	
disease	is	to	introduce	a	costly	additive	to	the	water	supply.	Additive	A	will	
protect	the	whole	population	against	the	disease,	and	therefore	everyone	will	
be	obligated	to	contribute	to	this	scheme.	It	costs	ten	units	per	person.	
Additive	B,	due	to	small	genetic	differences,	is	only	effective	on	a	certain	racial	
group,	who	make	up	half	the	population.	It	costs	five	units	per	person.	The	
other	half	of	the	population	can	be	protected	by	Additive	C,	which	costs	fifteen	
units	per	person.	Therefore,	we	must	either	create	one	scheme,	which	
introduces	Additive	A,	or	two	separate	schemes,	which	introduce	Additives	B	
and	C.	
	
At	the	very	least,	there	are	strong	moral	reasons	for	the	group	to	prefer	the	scheme	
which	introduces	Additive	A,	since	it	will	distribute	the	costs	among	beneficiaries	in	a	
way	that	is	fairer.	More	strongly,	we	might	think	that	they	are	obligated	to	introduce	
Additive	A.	
	
Here	we	see	how	a	concern	for	fairness	can	dictate	which	of	several	possible	fair	play	
schemes	we	ought	to	institute.	And	the	same	can	surely	be	said	of	choosing	between	
differing	schemes	which	will	lend	children	essential	goods.	If	one	scheme	will	lead	to	
fairer	outcomes,	that	is	a	reason	for	preferring	that	scheme.	Thus,	the	concern	for	
fairness	which	drives	the	expensive	children	objection	also	seems	to	provide	the	
solution.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	the	distribution	of	burdens	within	a	scheme	
cannot	pay	attention	to	fairness,	nor	that	considerations	of	fairness	cannot	speak	in	
favour	of	one	scheme	over	another	(as	in	Additive).	Given	this,	the	receipt	of	benefits	
can	generate	liability	to	contribute,	without	the	level	of	contribution	required	being	
calculated	in	isolation	from	considerations	of	fairness.	Therefore,	I	think	we	can	resist	
the	expensive	children	objection.29	
	
Conclusions	
Who	should	pay	the	costs	of	raising	children	is	an	important	political	issue,	and	one	
that	deserves	greater	attention	from	political	philosophers.	The	literature	largely	
focuses	on	presenting	children	as	an	expensive	taste,	or	as	a	public	good.	Therefore	our	
                                                
29	For	an	argument	with	a	similar	structure	in	a	different	context,	see	Miriam	Ronzoni’s	(2009)	
claim	that	even	if	we	accept	that	justice	is	confined	to	the	basic	structure,	we	can	nevertheless	
have	duties	to	create	a	certain	size	or	type	of	basic	structure.	
  22	
attention	is	focused	on	the	choices	of	parents	and	on	non-parents’	receipt	of	a	future	
benefit	as	bases	of	liability.	I	have	not	tried	to	show	that	these	are	not	appropriate	
bases	of	liability	for	the	costs	of	raising	children.	Rather,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	our	
discussion	of	how	we	should	divide	these	costs	should	not	be	limited	to	these	bases	of	
liability,	and	to	these	parties.	The	arguments	of	this	paper	suggest	that	we	may	be	able	
to	foist	some	of	the	benefits	of	upbringing	ont0	children,	and	then	claim	repayment	
later.	I	have	tried	to	show	that	this	is	a	plausible	basis	of	liability	by	focusing	on	the	
situation	that	children	are	in:	they	require	essential,	expensive	goods,	but	are	unable	to	
consent	to	receiving	or	paying	for	them.	However,	they	are	the	primary	beneficiaries	of	
child-raising	schemes,	and	a	fair	division	of	the	costs	should	include	them.	I	have	
considered	several	objections	to	this	line	of	thinking,	namely:	that	parents	enjoy	and	
benefit	from	parenting;	that	parents	are	responsible	for	the	existence	of	the	costs;	and	
that	the	scheme	has	inegalitarian	implications.	Much	more	would	need	to	be	said	
about	how	to	implement	the	view,	and	doubtless	there	are	many	more	objections	to	
consider,	but	I	hope	I	have	at	least	shown	that	it	is	a	credible	candidate.	
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